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During the 1930s the federal government embarked upon an ambitious series of grant programs designed
to counteract the Great Depression.  The amounts distributed varied widely across the country and
potentially contributed to population shifts. We estimate an aggregate discrete choice model, in which
household heads choose among 466 economic subregions. The structural model allows us to decompose
the effects of program spending on migration into three categories: the effect of spending on keeping
households in their origin (retention), the effect of pulling non-migrants out of their origin (creation),
and the effect of causing migrants to substitute away from an alternative destination (diversion). An
additional dollar of public works and relief spending increased net migration into an area primarily
by retaining the existing population and creating new migration into the county. Only a small share
of the increase in net migration rate was caused by diversion of people who had already chosen to
migrate. AAA spending contributed to net out migration, primarily by creating new out migrants and
repelling potential in migrants. A counterfactual analysis suggests that the uneven distribution of New
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What is the impact of federal government programs on internal migration pat-
terns? There is a large literature in regional economics and public economics
on Tiebout models where people migrate across states and counties to take ad-
vantage of di⁄erences in taxation and spending policies. Much of the literature
focuses on the impact of state and local government ￿scal choices and the impact
of policy competition among localities.1 Yet, the federal government￿ s distrib-
ution of funds across districts can also be extremely important. Locations of
federal highways and military bases in￿ uence patterns of migration. One of the
greatest experiments with federal spending in local areas occurred during the
1930s, when a wide range of New Deal grants programs were established to com-
bat the problems arising from the Great Depression. A large literature on the
political economy of that spending shows that there was substantial variation
in federal grants across states and counties (see Fishback, Kantor and Wallis,
2003 for a summary).
In a recent study Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor [FHK] (2006) examined
the impact of federal grants on net migration for over 3000 counties. They ￿nd
that New Deal public works and relief grants stimulated net in-migration into
counties and that the Agricultural Adjustment Administration￿ s payments to
farmers to take land out of production was associated with net out-migration.
The FHK study, however, was limited to the study of a summary measure, net
migration, and thus was unable to examine the ￿ ows of people from location to
location. In this paper we use information from the 1940 Census on locations
of households in 1935 and 1940 to estimate a model in which households are
choosing among 466 state economic areas (SEAs). We build an aggregate dis-
1See Rhode and Strumpf (2003) for a summary of the literature and results that do not
￿nd much Tiebot sorting over long time periods in response to state and local government
goods provision.
3crete choice model from a random utility model of locational choice to estimate
the impacts of spending on these programs on migration patterns.
When we combine the structure of the model with the information on ￿ ows
of migration between the SEAs, we are able to derive a series of inferences about
the impact of New Deal programs on the substitution patterns of migrants be-
tween locations. We compute marginal e⁄ects of program spending that are
decomposed into three distinct e⁄ects. The ￿rst is migration creation. A mi-
grant is "created" by a program when program spending causes a household
that would otherwise have remained in its 1935 location to migrate to a given
location. The second, a retention e⁄ect, occurs when a migrant is "retained"
because program spending causes a household that would have out-migrated
otherwise to remain in the 1935 location. Finally, migration diversion results
when a migrating household is diverted to another location.
The structural nature of our model also allows us to estimate counterfactuals
to identify the overall e⁄ect of New Deal spending on migration, an analysis that
FHK (2006) could not perform. We estimate counterfactuals for the absence of
each of two major categories of New Deal spending, as well as a counterfactual
for the absence of all New Deal spending. The results show that an additional
dollar of public works and relief spending at the margin increased net migra-
tion into an area primarily by retaining the existing population and creating
new migration into the county. Only a small share of the increase in the net
migration rate was caused by diverting people who were already migrating to
another place into the location. A similar story can be told about the magni-
tudes of the marginal e⁄ects of an added dollar of per capita AAA spending,
except the direction of the e⁄ect was negative as AAA spending served to stim-
ulate out-migration in all three ways. A counterfactual analysis that examines
what would have happened had there been no New Deal spending during the
41930s suggests that the uneven distribution of New Deal public works and relief
spending explains about twelve percent of the internal migration ￿ ows in the
United States between 1935 and 1940, while the uneven distribution of AAA
spending accounted for about one percent.
2 New Deal Programs
We consider two categories of per capita New Deal grants that may have a⁄ected
the desirability of a location: AAA farm grants and public works and relief
grants. The AAA grants were made to farmers who voluntarily removed land
from production for designated crops.2 The goal of the program was to increase
the incomes of farmers, both directly through bene￿t payments and indirectly
by raising market prices to pre World War I levels (1920s levels for tobacco),
through the curtailment of the output of speci￿c crops.3 The AAA programs
2Prior to 1936, the ￿rst version of the AAA made rental and bene￿t payments to farmers
who removed land from the production of designated crops. After the program was struck
down as unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1935, the AAA was redesigned,
to make "soil conservation payments" through the Soil Domestic Allotment Act (SDAA).
In the original AAA the bene￿t payments were ￿nanced from special processing taxes on
the commodity being curtailed. There was a general belief that most of the burden of the
processing taxes would be passed on to consumers of farm products. After the Supreme Court
declared the processing taxes unconstitutional, the SDAA eliminated the processing taxes and
the funds were appropriated from the general budget.
3The AAA was administered by the Department of Agriculture, which established state and
local committees or associations of producers to help administer the act. The administration of
the Act was often done through a series of programs speci￿c to the household crops. Thus the
geographic distribution of the AAA funds across counties was determined by the crop choices
made prior to the AAA involvement and by the parameters set for each of the crops. For
each crop the actual distribution of funds was determined by a complex interaction between
federal administrators, local committees, local extension agents, and the farmers who decided
to join the program. Since this was a voluntary program, farmers had to agree to sign up
for the acreage reduction program. For signing up to reduce acreage, their payments were
based on multiplying the national price set for acreage reduction and their average yield per
acre over a base period. Thus, the program had to be made attractive enough for farmers to
agree to join. The federal decision makers in￿uenced the attractiveness of the program by the
national price they set for acreage reduction and by the acreage that they asked the farmers to
take out of production. In the case of tobacco and cotton the federal decision-makers added a
degree of coercion to the system by levying heavy taxes on any production beyond designated
limits. The local administrators in￿uenced the attractiveness of the program through decisions
on base-year yields for the household farmer and the acreage the farmers would be allowed
to produce. In addition, the e⁄ort they put into marketing the program and cajoling their
neighbors helped determine the sign-up rates.
5likely had con￿ icting e⁄ects on migration. The farmers who received payments
from the AAA were likely to stay in farming and, thus, less likely to migrate.
In contrast, farm workers and tenants might have been pushed out by the AAA
because the AAA payments led to reductions in acreage under cultivation, which
was likely to lead to a decrease in the demand for farm workers (Alston 1981;
Holley, Winston, and Woofter 1971; Saloutos 1974; Mertz 1978; Whatley 1983;
Biles 1994, 39-43, Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor 2006).
New Deal funds also were distributed to local economies through public
works and relief grants. Relief grants were primarily distributed under the
auspices of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) from 1933
through mid 1935, the Civil Works Administration (CWA) from November 1933
through March 1934, the Works Progress Administration (WPA) from mid 1935
through 1942, and the Social Security Administration￿ s Aid to the Blind, Aid to
Dependent Children, and Old-Age Assistance programs after 1935. The princi-
pal goal of these programs was to provide immediate relief to unemployed and
low-income people, as 85 percent of the grants were used to hire the unemployed
on work relief jobs. These relief jobs ranged from make-work activities to main-
tenance activities to the building of sidewalks, post o¢ ces, schools, local roads,
and other additions to local infrastructure.
The public works grants included expenditures by the Public Works Ad-
ministration (PWA), Public Buildings Administration, and the Public Roads
Administration. These grants were also used largely to employ workers. Many
of the workers were hired directly from the relief rolls, but the public works
programs had more freedom to hire a broader class of workers who were not
on relief. The public works programs were said to be more focused on build-
ing larger scale projects such as dams, roads, schools, and sanitation facilities.
Both public works and relief grants were likely to attract migrants to local areas
6because they provided either work opportunities on federal projects or support
for the unemployed. This e⁄ect was mitigated to the extent that local relief
administrators imposed residency requirements
The major relief and public works programs had the potential to stimulate
migration across counties, as the unemployed sought work in areas with new
relief and public works projects. The economics literature on the impact of
welfare bene￿ts on locational choice in the modern era is mixed, some ￿nd
that movement of low-income people is positively correlated to di⁄erences in
states￿ welfare bene￿t levels (Gramlich and Laren 1984, Blank 1988, Mo¢ t
1992), while others ￿nd a small or negligible e⁄ect (Allard and Danziger 2000;
Kau⁄man and Kiesling 1997, and Levine and Zimmerman 1999). We should
note that our measure of relief and public works spending is total spending
per capita, so it combines both di⁄erences in the number of people obtaining
funds and the monthly payments to recipients of emergency jobs or direct relief.
There were federal e⁄orts to establish a certain minimum level of bene￿ts, but
the eventual compromise between o¢ cials at all levels was to pay attention to
prevailing wage levels. Faced with extraordinary unemployment rates, relief
o¢ cials were forced to make trade-o⁄s between providing adequate bene￿ts and
￿nding work for as many unemployed workers as possible (see Brown 1940,
Howard 1943, Williams 1968, Wallis and Benjamin 1981). Given the large
number of unemployed workers, access to bene￿ts might have been as important
as the actual level of bene￿ts.
Since the public works and relief projects involved not only relief of eco-
nomic distress, but also led to expansions in civil infrastructure that potentially
promoted economic activity in a deeply depressed national economy, we might
expect to see more of a migration response in the 1930s than we would for fed-
eral welfare programs in the modern era. The migration response during the
7Depression, however, might have been limited by a complex web of residency
requirements for relief eligibility. Unlike modern federal welfare programs that
have largely eliminated residency requirements since 1970 (Gramlich and Laren
1984, 490), the residency requirements of the Depression-era relief programs
were determined largely by state and local governments, sometimes in ways that
seemed to violate the spirit of federal statements. Donald Howard (1943, 332-7)
noted that the o¢ cial WPA policy as of 1939 was that eligible people could
not be refused certi￿cation for work relief jobs on the basis of non-residence
in the area. At the same time, the WPA did not want families moving for
the ￿sole purpose￿of obtaining a relief job. Most of the barriers to movement
were erected by state and local bureaucracies, which created elaborate proce-
dures for transferring workers￿records from one state to another and required
that workers reestablish their eligibility in new places, among other factors. An
unemployed worker took an additional risk by moving because state and local
length-of-residency requirements for direct relief and public assistance may have
di⁄ered. The de facto result might have been limits on non-residents￿abilities to
qualify for the WPA positions. On the other hand, to the extent that work relief
projects stimulated the local economy, there may have been increased private
opportunities for migrants.
The FERA policies for most types of relief were similar to the later WPA
policies, although the FERA explicitly provided a small portion of its funds for
the transient population. Josephine Brown (1940, 250) noted that federal FERA
policy forbade discrimination against non-residents, blacks, aliens, and veterans,
￿yet the fact remained that the actual administration of relief was in the hands of
local authorities and the promulgation of a rule by the FERA was not su¢ cient
in many cases to overcome sectional traditions and prejudices in a comparatively
short time.￿Aware of this problem, the FERA formulated a transient program
8for workers with less than a year￿ s continuous residence (Williams 1968, 172-
3). The program was funded by the federal government and administered by
the states. It typically provided aid to the transient unemployed who could
not have obtained aid under the legal settlement or residency requirements of
the states (Webb 1936, 1-4, 16). The transient program accounted for about
2 percent of the total obligations of FERA programs (Federal Works Agency,
Works Progress Administration 1942, 74 and 81), so in the ￿nal analysis the
impact of FERA spending on migration patterns may not have di⁄ered much
from that of the WPA. 4
3 Migration and the Location Choice Literature
Sjaastad (1962) viewed migration as an investment in obtaining access to a labor
market with higher wages. The moving costs are treated as the ￿xed costs of
the investment while the gain in earnings is the return. A household chooses to
migrate if the present value of the migration is less than the cost of undertaking
it. In his adaptation of the Roy (1951) model, Borjas et al.(1992) develops a
theoretical model predicting that households will sort themselves into regions
paying the highest return to their skills. They ￿nd that individuals who face
a mismatch between their skills and rewards to their skills are more likely to
migrate, i.e. highly educated individuals living in states with a relatively low
return to education will migrate to a state with higher returns to education.
Later papers in the literature apply discrete choice models to location choice
among migrants. A seminal paper in this literature was Bartel (1989), which
studies the secondary migration choices of international migrants. In the con-
text of a location choice model, she estimates the e⁄ects of ethnicity, population,
4The Civilian Conservation Corps often moved young men across states, but we do not
have county level information on the CCC and, thus, cannot measure its impact in this study.
9social welfare programs, and distance on the probability of moving to a partic-
ular destination. She ￿nds that the level of general assistance payments in a
destination is positively and signi￿cantly correlated with a migrants probability
of choosing the destination.
Schaefer (1989) analyzes location choices in the southern United States in the
1850￿ s to examine non-slave owners￿preferences over the racial composition of
a destination county. Jaeger (2000) studies the location choice of newly arrived
international migrants. He ￿nds that migrants are more likely to locate in areas
with disproportionately high foreign born populations. Herzog and Schlottmann
(1986) used a binary logit model to study how amenities weigh in the decision
to migrate or stay. Cragg and Kahn (1997) also use a conditional logit model of
the destination choice of migrants. The structural nature of this model allows
them to calculate migrants￿willingness to pay for climate characteristics.
The common thread of these papers is the estimation of a discrete choice
model that leads to a structural interpretation of the parameters, allowing the
researcher to answer various questions, which could not be addressed in non-
structural models. In this paper we estimate structural model of migration in
order to calculate e⁄ects of New Deal spending on migration patterns which
would not be computed for a linear model of net migration.
4 Data
The data set is built up from a variety of sources, but we will focus on two sources
here. The U.S. O¢ ce of Government Reports (1940) reported the distribution
of New Deal grants for public works, relief programs, and AAA payments across
counties. Meanwhile, the 1940 Population Census was the ￿rst decennial census
to ask respondents about their place of residence in preceding years, in this case
1935. While information on previous county of residence is not available from
10the IPUMS, we are able to identify the "state economic area" (SEA) where the
respondent resided in 1935.5 Our sample consists of all native households for
which location variables were available, giving us a total of 337,803 observa-
tions. We observe 466 SEA￿ s that fully cover the continental states, excluding
Washington, D.C, and the Alaska and Hawaii territories. In order to measure
rates of migration, we construct a Markov transition matrix using the IPUMS
extract of the 1940 Census 5 percent microsample.6
Figures 1 through 3 show that there is a signi￿cant amount of variation in
migration rates and New Deal programs that can be used to identify the e⁄ects
of the New Deal grants. Figure 1 plots the in-migration and out-migration
per 100 people in 1930 for each of the SEAs. The ￿gure shows quite a bit of
variation in both types of migration rates and only hints at the information we
use in estimating the model because it does not show the ￿ ows between SEAS,
which are a key part of our model. Figures 2 and 3 plot the net-migration
rates against public works and relief grants per capita and AAA grants per
capita. Net migration rates range from -20 percent to nearly 40 percent of the
1930 population in the SEAs, while public works and relief spending per capita
varies from close to zero in some SEAS to over $300 per capita in some locations.
The AAA distribution of grants was not as dispersed, but there still remains an
extensive spread.
5The SEAs were developed by Donald Bogue to combine ￿relatively homogeneous￿counties
within a state (See Bogue and Beale (1953) and Bogue (1951). Bogue led a research team
that analyzed how individual characteristics in￿uenced the migration patterns across these
regions. For example, see Bogue, et. al. (1957).
6A complete description of the sources of the New Deal spending variables and demo-
graphic, geographic, and economic characteristics of SEAs can be found at Price Fish-
back￿ s website, http://www.u.arizona.edu/~￿shback/ in the information on the construction
of varaibles for the Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor (2005a, 2005b, 2006) migration and retail
sales papers. The county-level data underlying the SEA aggregates for this study can be found
there.
115 Identifying Program E⁄ects
Our evaluation of the impact of New Deal spending is built up from a struc-
tural model of household choice. We start with a model of individual household
choices and then show how an aggregate discrete choice model-one that uses
shares of households making a decision rather than discrete decisions of individ-
ual households-can be used to estimate the parameters of this model.
5.1 Household Decision Model (CLOGIT)
Each household in our sample resided in one of 466 "State Economic Areas" in
1935. Between 1935 and 1940, each of these households decided where to locate
in 1940: in the 1935 location, or in one of the 465 other SEAs in the country.
Consider the following utility function for households.
Uij = Xoj￿ + ￿oj + "ij (1)
The term Uij represents the utility to the ith household of residing in the jth
location in 1940. The utility for households from origin o is determined by the
characteristics of the location j to households from origin o, Xoj. The product
Xoj￿ represents the utility the household receives from these characteristics,
where ￿ is a vector of marginal utilities.
The purpose for including the subscript o is that characteristics of locations,
such as distance, will di⁄er across origins. For example, the distance between
Southern California and Northern California is signi￿cantly lower than the dis-
tance between Florida and Northern California. If we assume that the utility
of distance traveled, ￿Distance, is negative, then
XNorCal;SoCal ￿ ￿Distance > XFlorid;SoCal ￿ ￿Distance (2)
12Thus, because one of the characteristics of Southern California as a migration
destination (distance), varies between two di⁄erent origins, Northern California
and Florida, the utility of the location will di⁄er across origins. Note how-
ever, that this utility does not di⁄er among households from a common origin:
the term Xoj￿ assigns the same level of utility of locating in location j to all
households from origin o.
Simply specifying the utility of the location as Xoj￿ is unreasonable in two
ways. First, it assumes that all characteristics that in￿ uence the decision of the
household are observed by the econometrician. This assumption can be relaxed
by introducing an error term that represents the utility of the location derived
from characteristics observed by the household but not by the econometrician,
￿oj.
While the introduction of the ￿oj term eliminates the "omnipotent econome-
trician" assumption, the model still has one unreasonable property. It predicts
that households from a common origin will all make the same location deci-
sion because the term Xoj￿ + ￿oj does not vary among households within the
origin. The common way to relax this assumption is to introduce a random
error term "ij that varies across both households and locations. These " terms
can be thought of as random draws from a distribution of consumer tastes in
a population. Because these draws introduce heterogeneity into the model,
all households from a common origin will no longer make the same locational
choice. For example, suppose household 1 has a high unobservable taste for
location 6, while household 2 does not. The di⁄erence implies that "16 > "26,
thus U16 > U26.
The standard assumption about these error terms is that they are identically
and independently distributed across both i and j. The " terms are assumed
to be from a Type One Extreme Value Distribution, which we discuss further
13below. This framework allows us to address the utility maximization prob-
lem in a way that is econometrically convenient while still making reasonable
assumptions about consumer preferences.
The household chooses from the set of 466 destinations the location which
provides the highest level of utility. Location j will be the utility maximizing
location if
Uij > Uik 8 j 6= k (3)
In terms of our model, we can express this term as
Xoj￿ + ￿oj + "ij > Xok￿ + ￿ok + "ik 8 j 6= k (4)
Isolating the "idiosyncratic taste" terms " on the left hand side
"ij ￿ "ik > Xok￿ ￿ Xoj￿ + ￿ok ￿ ￿oj8j 6= k (5)
The probability that the household will choose location j is then
Pr(Uij > Uik) 8 j 6= k (6)
Pr("ij ￿ "ik > Xok￿ ￿ Xoj￿ + ￿ok ￿ ￿oj) 8 j 6= k
The payo⁄ to the distributional assumption about " comes from the result
that the di⁄erence between two draws from the Type One Extreme Value Dis-
tribution takes the logistic distribution. De￿ne the indicator variable Yij as a
variable that takes on a value of 1 if household i chooses location j and 0 oth-
erwise. McFadden (1973) shows that by integrating out over the distribution
14of the logistic distribution, we can obtain the following probabilities:
Pr(Yij = 1) =
exp(Xoj￿ + ￿oj)
PJ
J=1 exp(Xoj￿ + ￿oj)
(7)










J=1 exp(Xoj￿ + ￿oj)
(8)
This is equivalent to McFadden￿ s choice model (Conditional Logit) with one
important distinction: McFadden does not consider the ￿ term. If the true
value of ￿ were known, it could be treated as an observable. However, because












J=1 exp(Xoj￿ + ￿oj)
@￿ (9)
One important distinction between the ￿ and " terms is that we cannot
obtain an analytical integral over the distribution of both variables. Hence
we would have to compute the integral over ￿ using numeric methods. This
is most commonly accomplished through simulation. Taking simulation draws
s = 1;2:::;NS from the distribution of ￿, we can compute the average of the
likelihood function at these simulated draws and then estimate the parameters













J=1 exp(Xoj￿ + ￿soj)
(10)
155.1.1 Relaxing the i.i.d. Assumption in the Household Decision
Model (NLOGIT):
One problematic assumption made in this type of model is that the " terms
are i:i:d: across j: This assumption implies that the idiosyncratic taste for one
option in the choice set contains no information about the idiosyncratic tastes
for other locations. This would be an unreasonable assumption if we believe
that a household with a strong taste for a location such as Southern Arizona
would not also be likely to have a high taste for a similar neighboring region, such
as Central Arizona. If this assumption is violated, the integration McFadden
uses to obtain the probabilities used in the likelihood function is invalid, and
the model is mispeci￿ed.
One way to address this problem is to create a set of choices among which
we expect there to be correlated tastes. For example, individuals who have
a high unobservable utility from migrating to an SEA in one state may be
more likely to have a high unobservable utility draw to migrating to any other
SEA within the same state. Here, to account for this issue, we group choices
by state. While the model maintains the assumption that the households￿"
draws are independent among locations in di⁄erent states, we allow there to be
correlation among locations within a given state.
Cardell (1997) develops a model based on a random utility function that
allows for "within group" correlation while maintaining the assumption of i:i:d:
draws outside of the groups. Cardell expresses the idiosyncratic utility term as
a weighted average of a term that is i:i:d over j, and a term which is common
among choices in a group gj (a given state).
Uij = Xoj￿ + ￿oj + ￿￿igj + (1 ￿ ￿)"ij (11)
For notational convenience in the following example, de￿ne the total idio-
16syncratic utility of the choice as.
’ij = ￿￿igj + (1 ￿ ￿)"ij (12)
The natural interpretation of the term ￿ is a measure of how strong the
"within" state correlation among the ’ terms are. When ￿ is equal to 1, the
idiosyncratic utility term is identical among all locations within the state.
If ￿ is equal to zero, there will be no within group correlation in the ’ terms.
A ￿ close to zero suggests that there is no correlation between unmeasured and
stochastic factors in the same state; therefore, a household will be almost equally
likely to choose a location outside the state as one inside the state, conditional
upon observables. In other words, there is little reason to nest the choices at
the state level in a conditional logit.
Consider how this model allows for correlation in the ’ terms for two loca-
tions in the same state:
Cov(’ij;’ikjjk 2 g \ j 2 g]) (13)




= ￿2 ￿ ￿2
￿
Note, however, that there is no covariance between two terms that are not
in the same state:
Cov(’ij;’ikjjk = 2 g \ j 2 g]) (14)
= Ef[￿￿ig + (1 ￿ ￿)"ij] ￿ [￿￿ig + (1 ￿ ￿)"ik]jk = 2 g \ j 2 g]g
= 0
17The probability of observing household i choosing location j now becomes
the product of two terms. The ￿rst is the probability of household i choosing
location j conditional upon choosing one of the locations in the same state as j,
while the second term is the probability of the household choosing any SEA in
the state to which SEA j belongs. Note that for a ￿ value of 0, this likelihood
function is identical to that of the equation 10.





















5.1.2 Complications to the Household Decision Model:
There are a number of signi￿cant challenges to implementing this estimator,
particularly when trying to resolve problems with potential endogeneity of the
New Deal programs; therefore, we identify the parameters of the random utility
function using the aggregate discrete choice model, rather than household data.
One problem with using individual households as the unit of observation is
the sheer number of observations. The census data we use contains observa-
tions on the location choice of 337,803 households choosing between 466 SEAs.
At each iteration of the MLE estimation, this would require over 150 million
computations of the location speci￿c utility for each household. For each of
these 150 million calculations, our model would also require us to numerically
integrate out over the ￿ term using simulation methods. Clearly, this approach
to estimation involves signi￿cant computational burdens.
An additional issue we must address is the possible endogeneity of New
Deal program spending. From a statistical standpoint, it would be ideal if the
18New Deal grants were distributed on a random basis and, thus, could serve
as a natural experiment. Of course, there is plenty of evidence that the New
Deal grants were not distributed in a random fashion across areas. More per
capita relief grants were distributed to areas with higher unemployment and
greater drops in economic activity between 1929 and 1933 (Fishback, Kantor
and Wallis 2003). Although we control for some of these factors, we still need
to worry about potential endogeneity bias in the coe¢ cients if the New Deal
grants were distributed in response to unmeasured characteristics of the location
that in￿ uenced the attractiveness of the location to migrants. Instrumenting for
program spending in the household based model would involve fully specifying
the data generating process for ￿ and integrating out over its distribution. A
signi￿cant advantage of the aggregate discrete choice model is that it will allow
us to instrument for New Deal grants using two-stage-least-squares (2SLS).
5.2 Using an Aggregate Discrete Choice Model
An alternative to estimating the household discrete choice model is the use of an
aggregate discrete choice model, which is free of the complications of the prior
model. The seminal paper developing this methodology is Berry (1994). Over
the last ten years, the "Berry Inversion" has become common in the empirical
industrial organization literature.
Recall the probabilities in the likelihood function for the conditional logit
model:
Pr(Yij = 1) =
exp(Xoj￿ + ￿oj)
PJ
J=1 exp(Xoj￿ + ￿oj)
(16)
Note that the the right hand term varies across o, but not across i. In this model
individuals from the same origin have equal chances of migrating to location j.
19Accordingly, the probability that an individual from o moves to j can also be
interpreted as the share of individuals from o moving to j. De￿ne soj as the
share of households from origin o moving to location j.
soj = Pr(Yij = 1) =
exp(Xoj￿ + ￿oj)
PJ
j=1 exp(Xoj￿ + ￿oj)
(17)
Similarly, we can de￿ne the share of households from origin o who remain in the
origin, soo, as
soo = Pr(Yio = 1) =
exp(Xoo￿ + ￿oo)
PJ
j=1 exp(Xoj￿ + ￿oj)
(18)























= (Xoj ￿ Xoo)￿ + (￿oj ￿ ￿oo)
We observe choices made by households in 466 SEAs. Each of these house-
holds chooses between the 466 locations in their choice set. The information
needed to construct our dependent variable is essentially a transformation of a
Markov transition matrix, (represented below) summarizing the movement of
households among 466 locations between 1935 and 1940. Rather than requiring
over 150 million computations (excluding the simulations over ￿) we now have
466*465=216690. The 466 cells along the diagonal of the matrix are the soo
terms used in the normalization. Note that the model is now invertible in ￿;
20this is a key result which will allow us to estimate the parameters of the random
utility function using conventional linear methods, such as 2SLS to instrument
for endogenous X variables.
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5.2.1 Relaxing the i.i.d. Assumption in the Aggregate Discrete
Choice Model:
Berry (1994) also derives an inversion of the nested logit model, whose likeli-
hood function is given in equation 15. In his paper, the inversion relies upon
an assumption that the "outside alternative" is a group to itself. In our model
groups are states and the households￿"outside alternative" is to choose not to
migrate. Berry￿ s assumption does not hold in our case as the option of staying
in the home SEA is just one of several choices available for the household that
chooses to remain in the home state (the group containing the "outside alter-
native"). In Appendix I we invert the nested likelihood model without relying
upon this assumption, arriving at the same result as Berry. The additional
term is the log of the share of the households from origin o choosing location j,






= (Xoj ￿ Xoo)￿ + ￿ ￿ ln(sojjgj) + (￿oj ￿ ￿oo) (20)
215.2.2 Instrumenting for New Deal Spending:
Because migration ￿ ows, or unobserved variables correlated with migration,
might have in￿ uenced the distribution of New Deal grants, there might be en-
dogeneity bias in the coe¢ cients on the New Deal variables. A priori, it is
di¢ cult to predict the direction or magnitude of the endogeneity bias. If out-
migration was associated with economic distress during the 1930s, local o¢ cials
may have sought greater New Deal funds from the federal government to alle-
viate the local unemployment situation and to stave o⁄ a continuing exodus of
the workforce. Roosevelt￿ s "relief, recovery, and reform" mantra would suggest
that federal o¢ cials targeted funds to alleviate such economic problems. In
fact, Fleck (1999a, 1999b, 2001a) and Fishback, Kantor, and Wallis (2003) ￿nd
that both relief and public works spending were positively related to unemploy-
ment in 1930. To the extent that out-migration was a symptom of unmeasured
unfavorable economic conditions, we might expect federal o¢ cials to have dis-
tributed more funds to areas where people were more likely to leave than to
arrive. Thus, the endogeneity bias might have been negative, causing the OLS
coe¢ cient to understate a positive e⁄ect that public works and relief spending
might have had in attracting migrants.
Alternatively, the endogeneity bias could have gone the other way. Increased
in-migration placed greater pressure on public facilities, such as schools and san-
itation and water systems, which would have encouraged local o¢ cials to lobby
for New Deal projects that would have alleviated these population pressures. In
addition, if migrants into a county misestimated the employment opportunities
in their new homes, their arrival might have contributed to greater unemploy-
ment and the need for federal New Deal assistance. However, the tendency for
local relief o¢ cials to restrict non-residents￿relief certi￿cation was likely to have
mitigated this e⁄ect.
22It is also likely that the AAA variable is endogenous, but the direction of
the bias is unclear. Unlike the relief programs, the objective of the AAA was
to limit national production of various commodities to raise farm-gate prices.
The parameters were designed with national prices and production in mind and,
therefore, were not explicitly tied to local problems. The o¢ cials￿parameter
choices, however, might have been indirectly in￿ uenced by local conditions be-
cause national AAA parameters depended on the need to raise prices for speci￿c
crops. Since crop mix varied substantially across the country and the distress
in speci￿c crops may have been felt more heavily in some areas than in others,
local agricultural conditions may have indirectly in￿ uenced the policy parame-
ters that determined the distribution of AAA funds. Thus, to the extent AAA
o¢ cials were seeking to raise prices by reducing production, they may have seen
reductions in production caused by the out-migration of farmers as a means
in itself to limit supply and, thus, saw less of a need to provide AAA funds.
Under these conditions, the OLS coe¢ cient of the AAA variable is likely biased
in a positive direction. On the other hand, federal o¢ cials may have seen out-
migration as a sign of distress and, thus, more reason to ￿nd ways to prop up
farmers in those areas. In this case the OLS coe¢ cient would be biased in a
negative direction.
One of the key advantages of the share-based model is that we can instrument
for endogenous variables using the standard Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS)
procedure. Relevant and valid instruments are correlated with the level of New
Deal spending but uncorrelated with unobservables a⁄ecting the utility of the
location.
There is an extensive literature on the political economy of the supply of
New Deal program spending.7 Robert Fleck (1999a), Fishback, Haines, and
7For discussions of the determinants of New Deal spending, see Reading 1973; Wright
1974; Wallis 1987, 1998, and 2001; Anderson and Tollison 1991; Couch and Shughart 1998;
Couch, Atkinson, and Wells, 1998; Fleck 1999a, 1999b, 2001a, 2001b; Couch and Williams
23Kantor (2001), and Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor (2005b, 2006) have had suc-
cess using some of these political supply variables as instruments in studies of
unemployment statistics, birth and death rates, retail sales growth, and net
migration. Based on these studies, the political supply equation for New Deal
spending includes quite a few factors that likely in￿ uenced the household￿ s choice
to migrate to a location. These might include the typical party a¢ liations, the
long-term structural features of the economy, the size of the population, the
ethnic structure of the population, opportunities for home ownership and other
socioeconomic factors. These factors are already incorporated in the vector of
attributes associated with locations in the migration share analysis. There are
other factors, however, that either would not be expected to in￿ uence the attrac-
tiveness of locations to migrants, or would have in￿ uence only indirectly through
incomes and the other socioeconomic factors already included as attributes in
the migration analysis.
There are two New Deal political supply factors that potentially in￿ uenced
public works and relief spending but would have only indirectly in￿ uenced the
choice to migrate to a location, the land area in the SEA and the standard
deviation of the percent voting for the Democratic presidential candidate over
the period 1896 through 1928. Land area and population were key factors
in the formula for distributing road funding and larger counties and states in
terms of square mileage tended to receive larger Public Works Administration
grants (Fleck 2001b, Fishback, Kantor, and Wallis, 2003). The size of the SEAs
in square miles is determined by the counties￿geographic boundaries, which
were typically set long before the 1930s, and Bogue￿ s (1951) combination of
counties into relatively homogeneous SEAs. After controlling for a wide variety
of socioeconomic factors and for in-variant state e⁄ects, there is no apparent
1999; Stromberg 2004. Fishback, Kantor, and Wallis 2003. The last paper summarizes the
results of all of the studies and provides new estimates for a broad range of programs..
24reason why migrants would have additional reasons to care about the amount
of land in the county boundaries and then how many were grouped into the
SEAs. Since county boundaries (and thus economic sub-region boundaries)
often extended well beyond populated areas, the land area of the county would
not be an e⁄ective measure of the population density of a city and thus would
not be expected to appear in the migration decision.
Nearly all of the studies of the distribution of New Deal funds ￿nd that the
Roosevelt administration spent more in areas where there was greater swing
voting in presidential elections. Wright (1974), Wallis (1987, 1998, 2001), Fleck
(2001, 1999a), Couch and Shughart (1998) and several other scholars use the
standard deviation of the percent voting Democrat for president over a prior
period as a measure of swing voting. There is already temporal distance between
the migration decisions from 1935 to 1940 and the standard deviation measure
from 1896 to 1928. In the ￿nal migration equation we have already controlled for
political attitudes using the mean voting Democrat for president from 1896-1928
and state ￿xed e⁄ects of the destination, and subregion of origin ￿xed e⁄ects,
as well as a variety of other socioeconomic dimensions. It seems unlikely that
people would be paying attention to the swing voting issue in their migration
decisions once we have controlled for these factors.
In addition, we include a key political supply variable that in￿ uenced AAA
spending but at best would have in￿ uenced migration decisions only indirectly
through other channels that we have controlled for in the analysis: average
farm size in 1929. Average farm size strongly in￿ uenced the AAA distribution
at the county level (Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor 2006; Fishback, Kantor,
and Wallis 2003). The AAA has always been focused on large farms. The
average farm size measure is for the period prior to the New Deal and thus
farmers had no opportunity to change this size in anticipation of obtaining New
25Deal funds. Farm size, per se, would not have been a factor that would have
attracted or repelled migrations. It would have in￿ uenced migration patterns
by in￿ uencing the distribution of AAA funds, farm income, crop failures, and
farm productivity. These are all factors that we control for in the estimation of
the migration equation. We control for measures of income and wealth using the
level and growth rate of retail sales per capita, the home ownership percentage,
racial and ethnic shares of the population, and layo⁄s and unemployment. We
control for farm productivity and farm success using crop output per person,
and crop failures. We also control for the extent of farming with the percentage
of the rural population on farms. In addition, we incorporate a series of state
e⁄ects and subregion of origin e⁄ects that control for a variety of characteristics
of soil, climate, and other factors that might have in￿ uenced farm size and
migration decisions.
Since the true errors in the migration share equation are unknown by de￿n-
ition, we can never be sure that these identifying instruments are uncorrelated
with the error term. We can, however, use the Hansen J-statistic to test for
correlation between the identifying instruments and the estimated error term in
the migration share equations.
The ￿rst-stage equations in Table 2 show that the coe¢ cients of all of the
identifying instruments have the expected sign. Larger SEA land area and the
standard deviation of the percent voting Democrat for president were associated
with higher than average per capita public works and relief spending in the SEA.
Larger average farm size in 1929 was associated with higher AAA spending. The
coe¢ cient on the swing vote measure was a positive and signi￿cant determinant
of public works and relief spending. The F-statistics in the ￿rst stage are 4.73
for public works and relief and 8.63 for the AAA variable, both statistically
signi￿cant at the 99.9% level. The Hansen J-statistic shows that we cannot
26reject the hypothesis of no relationship between the identifying instruments as
a group and the estimated error term in the ￿nal migration share equation.
5.2.3 Instrumenting for the Within-Group Term in the Nested Logit
Speci￿cation:
The inversion of the nested logit model introduces an additional endogenous
variable into the model. The term ln(sojjgj) is endogenous if it is correlated with
￿. This will be the case when unobservables a⁄ecting the share of individuals
choosing location j also a⁄ect the share of individuals who choose j conditional
upon choosing one of the locations within the same state of j, that is, when
ln(sojjgj) is correlated with ￿.
Berry (1994) suggests that the number of choices within the nested group
might work as an instrument for the endogenous within group term. The va-
lidity of this instrument hinges upon the assumption that the number of SEAs
in a state is exogenously determined by the historical drawing of geographic
boundaries. Given that the number of counties was set many years before and
that Bogue combined counties into SEAs based primarily on factors that we
have already controlled for in the share equation, this seems to be a reasonable
assumption.8
The intuition for the relevancy of this instrument is best understood with
a simple example. When there are only two SEAs a1 and b1 in state g1 the
probability that a1 is the utility maximizing choice is the probability that a1 >
b1:
exp(Xa1￿)
exp(Xa1￿)+exp(Xb1￿) When state g2 contains three SEAs: a2, b2, and c2, the
probability that a2 is the utility maximizing choice, holding all else constant,
is the probability that a2 > b2 and a2 > c2:
exp(Xa2￿)
exp(Xa2￿)+exp(Xb2￿)+exp(Xc2￿)
8This is a relatively stronger assumption to make in the context of the IO literature. It
essentially means assuming that unobserved product characteristics will have no impact on
entry. However, in a geographic context, it is easier to believe that high draws of the ￿ term
does not cause new geographic entities to "enter" the choice set.
27a smaller number: Thus, we anticipate that the ln(sojjgj) variable would be
negatively related with the number of SEAs in a state. Are instrument is positive
and highly signi￿cant in the ￿rst stage estimation.
5.2.4 Further Controls for Unmeasured Heterogeneity Across SEAs:
There may be features of the SEAs that are observable to the migrants for
which we have no measures, denoted ￿ in the model. We observe households
from many origins o choosing whether or not to migrate to each SEA. By taking
the means for all observations for an SEA that have that SEA origin, we can use
a mean-di⁄erencing approach to control the unobservable features that in￿ uence
the utility of staying in that SEA (￿oo). Recall the econometric equation given






= (Xoj ￿ Xoo)￿ + (￿oj ￿ ￿oo) (21)
For each origin o, we sum this expression over locations j and scale by 1
J￿1



























￿ + (￿oj ￿ ￿oo) (22)
Subtracting this term from equation the 21 results in the econometric spec-















￿ + (￿oj ￿ ￿oo)]
= (Xoj ￿ Xoj)￿ + ￿oj ￿ ￿oj (23)
The mean di⁄erencing operation results in elimination of both observables and
unobservables of the origin from the speci￿cation. This operation helps ob-
tain consistent estimates of the ￿ parameters because one possible source of
endogeneity, correlation between ￿oo and Xoo has been eliminated.
The ￿xed e⁄ects estimator for the nested logit inversion is nearly identical to
the ￿xed e⁄ect estimator for the conditional logit inversion. The only di⁄erence












5.2.5 Heteroscedasticity and Clustering:
It can be shown that there is covariance between the error terms that share a
common origin. Because of this, our estimates of the standard errors on the
parameters of our model may be inconsistent. To address this problem, we
cluster standard errors for observations sharing a common origin.
5.2.6 Dealing with "Zero Shares":
One issue of concern in the estimations is the prevalence of origin-destination
pairs for which no migrations are observed. This is problematic in our model,
because we must take the log of the share of individuals choosing this destina-
tion, and natural log of zero is unde￿ned. To avoid this problem, the value
0.0000001 was added to all of the shares before they were logged.
296 Results
The nested logit speci￿cation of the model is estimated using both Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) and Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS). The results are re-
ported in the ￿rst two columns of Table 2. The attractiveness of the di⁄erent
New Deal Grants are quite di⁄erent for the AAA farm payments and the pub-
lic works and relief expenditures. In both the OLS and the IV estimations,
an increase in AAA spending per farm population in the SEA has a negative
and statistically signi￿cant impact on the utility of living there. On the other
hand, IV estimates of the e⁄ect of an increase in public works and relief grants
increased the SEA￿ s attractiveness. These results are similar to the ￿ndings
by Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor (2006) in analysis of net-migration between
1930 and 1940 at the county level. Their analysis was tightly constrained by
the absence of information on ￿ ows between locations and jurisdictions, which
limited what they could say about in-migration and out-migration decisions.
The OLS estimate of the parameter measuring the correlation of the
terms for choices in a given state is .233, which is statistically signi￿cant. Al-
though this would imply that the CLOGIT model is not the correct speci￿cation,
a positive bias in the OLS estimate of is anticipated because the share of in-
dividuals choosing to locate in destination SEA j, conditional upon migrating
to that state is expected to be positively correlated with the overall share of
individuals moving to SEA j. Additionally, we would expect that unobservables
that increase the share of individuals choosing j conditional upon choosing j￿ s
state would also positively e⁄ect the overall share of people choosing j. When
we instrument for the within state share term, the estimate of sigma is cut
sharply to a value of 0.016, which is not statistically signi￿cantly di⁄erent from
0. Therefore, when performing the computation for the marginal e⁄ects and
counterfactuals, we insert a value of zero in for sigma while using the remaining
30NLOGIT parameters.9
Many of the socioeconomic features of the SEAs have the expected in￿ uence
on the SEA￿ s attractiveness. Households were more likely to choose SEAs that
were nearer, had experienced less of a downturn between 1929 and 1933, had
greater economic activity in the form of retail sales purchases and crop values
per capita in the peak year of 1929, experienced fewer layo⁄s per capita in 1930,
had higher populations in 1930 and experienced greater population growth in
the 1920s. The main surprises were the positive e⁄ect of greater unemployment
in 1930 and the absence of a strong e⁄ect of the Dust Bowl.10
6.1 Marginal E⁄ects of Program Spending on Migration
Patterns
The point estimates in this model provide intuition about whether the charac-
teristics make the SEA more or less attractive to households. Given the logistic
character of the model and the large number of ￿ ows between SEAS, the point
estimates cannot be read as marginal e⁄ects. The parameters of the random
utility function instead can be used to examine three types of marginal e⁄ects of
the spending of an additional dollar of New Deal spending per capita: retention,
creation, and diversion. People who otherwise would have migrated are retained
in origin area o if the increase in program spending in area o causes them to
remain in area o rather than to migrate. Migration to area o is created when
the increase in spending causes people who otherwise would have remained in
their origin SEA j to choose instead to migrate to area o. Finally, migration
9When the value of sigma is not statistically signi￿cantly di⁄erent from 0, the NLOGIT
speci￿cation is essentially the same as the CLOGIT speci￿cation with the inclusions of an
additional irrelevant variable. Thus the CLOGIT results do not di⁄er signi￿cantly from the
NLOGIT results, and are available upon request from the authors.
10We have performed the analysis on migration patterns for blacks as well as for people
living on farms in 1935. Similar to the ￿ndings for all people, the qualitative results for
these groups showed that public works and relief spending promoted in-migration and AAA
spending promoted out-migration.
31is diverted to area o when the spending increase in area o causes people who
otherwise were migrating to another destination k to move instead to destina-
tion o. Thus, if we consider the overall e⁄ect of program spending on the level
of net migration to an SEA, retention is a decrease in out-migration, while the
sum of diversion and creation is an increase in in-migration.
Table 1 shows the formulas for calculating the marginal retention, creation,
and diversion e⁄ects associated with a one dollar per capita increase in spending
by a New Deal program. Consider the e⁄ects for the Boston SEA, denoted with
subscript o in Table 1. The retention e⁄ect is associated with people who would
have normally migrated from Boston but now stay in Boston due to a change
in program spending. This is a reduction in out-migration as people substitute
staying at home for migration. The marginal retention e⁄ect varies for each SEA
based on the share of people in the SEA choosing to stay home. Speci￿cally, the
share of people retained is calculated as the coe¢ cient ￿ of New Deal spending
per capita multiplied by the share of people from Boston staying in Boston (soo)
multiplied by one minus that same share (1￿soo). This value is then multiplied
by the number of people in Boston in 1930 (No) to convert the change in share
into the change in the number of people retained.
The increase in the number of in-migrants Boston from any given SEA k
as a result of a dollar increase in per capita program spending in Boston is
calculated by multiplying the New Deal coe¢ cient ￿ by the share of people
from SEA k moving to Boston (sok), by one minus that same share (1 ￿ sok),
and by the number of people in SEA k in 1930 (Nk). To get the total increase
in the number of in-migrants to Boston from all other SEAS, sum the number
from each SEA k across all of the SEAS except Boston.
The increase in in-migrants is the sum of the creation and diversion e⁄ects.
The creation e⁄ect captures people who would not have migrated without the
32increase in spending, but who are pulled out of their home SEAs and choose
to migrate to Boston in response to the rise in New Deal spending there. The
share of in-migrants created is found by multiplying the New Deal coe¢ cient ￿
by the share of people from k who choose to stay in k (skk) and by the share of
people in k who choose to move to Boston (sko). By multiplying this number by
the population of SEA k (Nk), we obtain the total number of migrations from
k to Boston. Summing this term over all SEAs beside Boston gives the total
number of migrants to Boston who would have stayed home in the absence of
the additional spending in Boston.
Migration diversion to Boston consists of people who were already migrating
to another SEA (say Providence) but switch to Boston in response to the rise
in New Deal spending there. To compute the share of individuals from origin
k who are diverted from Providence to Boston, the New Deal coe¢ cient ￿ is
multiplied by the share of individuals from SEA k who choose to migrate to
Providence and by the share of individuals from SEA k who choose to migrate
to Boston. Multiplying this number by the population of SEA k, we obtain
the total number of migrants from SEA k who are diverted from Providence to
Boston. After calculating this ￿gure for origin k for all SEAs other than Boston
and k, we sum over all those SEAs to obtain the total number of households
from origin k who are diverted to Boston. To ￿nd the total amount of diversion
to Boston for people migrating out of all origin SEAs, we compute the preceding
￿gure for all SEAs other than Boston and sum across all those origins.11
Since the marginal e⁄ects are determined in part by the migration shares, the
marginal e⁄ects are di⁄erent for each SEA. A list for each SEA is available from
the authors. Table 3 and Figures 4 and 5 show the averages of the marginal
11If we sum the creation e⁄ect for all SEAs and sum the retention e⁄ect for all SEAs, the
two sums will be equal. This occurs because of adding up restrictions caused by the fact that
internal migration ￿ows are zero-sum. Flows out of one SEA become ￿ows into another SEA.
For a mathematical proof see Appendix II.
33e⁄ects on migration ￿ ows as a percentage of the population for the SEAs in
each of the nine Census sub-regions for Public Works and Relief, as well as the
average of the raw e⁄ect on population ￿ ows into these regions. Table 4 and
Figures 6 and 7 present the same ￿gures for the e⁄ect of the AAA.
The regions where migration rates were most responsive to a marginal dollar
of New Deal spending were New England, the Mid Atlantic Region, the East
North Central Region, the East South Central Region, and South Atlantic Re-
gion (see Figure 4 and the top part of Table 3). An additional dollar of public
works and relief spending per capita in the average SEA in these ￿ve regions kept
0.053 to 0.069 percent of the 1930 population from out-migrating, created new
in-migration from other SEAs of 0.037 to 0.091 percent of the population, and
diverted enough migrants from other SEAs to these ones to raise in-migration
by another 0.003 to 0.009 percent of the 1930 population. The total e⁄ect on net
migration was between 0.092 to 0.166 percent. The e⁄ects in these ￿ve census
regions stand in contrast to the e⁄ects in the other four more western regions,
where a marginal increase in public works and relief spending only reduced out-
migration from 0.013 to 0.033 percent, created in-migrants from 0.029 to 0.032
percent, diverted migrants at a rate from 0.001 to 0.002 percent, and had a total
e⁄ect on net migration of between 0.045 to 0.067 percent.
We focus on migration rates because di⁄erences in population in the
subregions in￿ uence the migration ￿ ows. Figure 5 and the middle section of
Table 3 give a sense of how big the average migration ￿ ow was created, diverted
or prevented by an additional dollar per capita in public works and relief spend-
ing. The largest average e⁄ect for sub-regions was in the Middle Atlantic region,
which includes New York, Pennsylvania and Delaware. An additional dollar per
capita of public works and relief spending increased prevented an average of 215
people from out-migrating from the typical Mid-Atlantic sub-region, diverted
3425 migrants into that sub-region and attracted 315 new migrants from other
sub-regions. The ￿ ows in the western states were much lower, both because of
lower migration rates and lower base populations.
In contrast to the e⁄ect of public works and relief, the AAA e⁄ects on net-
migration are negative. The relative impact of AAA spending on migration
creation, diversion, and retention rates are shown in Figures 6 and 7 and Table
4. As was the case with the public works, the creation and retention e⁄ects are
substantially larger than the diversion e⁄ects of migration. The national means
in Table 4 and Figures 6 and 7 show that the negative AAA retention e⁄ect in
this case contributed to out-migration of 146 people or 0.06 percent of the base
population. The negative mean creation e⁄ect implies that an added dollar per
capita of AAA spending stopped 146 people or 0.071% of the base population
from migrating into the region (Todd: why are the percentages di⁄erent when
the ￿ ows are the same). The added AAA dollar,diverted another 11 people, or
-.005 percent of the population away from the typical sub-region.
There is a similar East-West divide in the magnitude of the marginal impact
of AAA spending per capita on migration rates, although the AAA e⁄ect was
negative.. An additional dollar of AAA spending per person on farms in the four
western regions decreased net migration rates between 0.066 to 0.097 percent,
while decreasing net migrations rates in the more eastern regions from 0.134 to
0.241 percent in Table 4.
The East-West contrast in the ￿ndings for net migration rates suggest that
eastern households considered the remaining SEAs in their region to be closer
substitutes to their own SEA than did households in SEAs in the west. Actual
in-migration and out-migration rates in the eastern SEAs were lower than those
of western SEAs: of the nine census regions, the four western regions had the
four highest rates of in-migration, and the three highest out-migration rates.
35These two sets of facts are consistent with a situation where people in the east
considered many SEAs to be similar to their own 1935 SEA and thus saw little
reason to move unless there was an external policy change that would widen
the di⁄erential between SEAs. In the west, on the other hand, there was much
greater variation in the unobservables that caused people to be more likely to
move, so that a single dollar change in New Deal spending did not generate as
much of a response.
6.2 Policy Simulations
In addition to estimating the marginal e⁄ects of a change in a variable on mi-
gration ￿ ows, we can also estimate what migration patterns would have looked
like under various counterfactuals. In such a simulation, we can set ￿ Xoj to a
counterfactual value, and compute estimated out-migration ￿ ows for each SEA




j=1 exp(￿ Xjo^ ￿)
(25)
By multiplying the estimated shares by the population and then summing
across all destinations we ￿nd the number of out-migrants for each SEA. And
then sum across all SEAs to obtain the total number of households out-migrating






￿ sjo ￿ No (26)
Since all out-migrants are in-migrants elsewhere, this would also be equal
to the total number of in-migrants. We then obtain the number of migrants in
each of the three counterfactual settings by inserting zero for the relevant New
Deal spending. The benchmark for our counterfactual analysis is the number of
36migrations predicted by the model at the actual levels of New Deal spending.
Table 5 presents the results of our counter factual estimations. While the
migration rates in the IPUMS 5% sample imply a total of over 9 million total
migrations between SEAs from 1935 to 1940, the model with actual New Deal
spending predicts a total of 6.5 million out-migrations of households. Removing
only the AAA grants leads to a modest increase of about 63,000 migrations, or
a 1% increase in migrations. Removing public works and relief spending, on
the other hand, leads to a prediction of only 5,802,387 migrations, a decrease of
12% from the predicted amount with all New Deal spending. Nearly an eighth
of all migrations that took place in the in the United States from 1935 to 1940
were a direct result of the way in which public works and relief grants were
distributed. Had these programs not existed, or had policy makers distributed
funds in such a way that per-capita levels of funding were equal across SEAs,
only 88% of migrants would have continued to move.
If New Deal spending on both the AAA and public works and relief had
been completely eliminated, there would have been 5,807,415 migrations, which
is 12 percent fewer migrations than the predicted number with the full amount
of New Deal spending. Note that the highly interactive nature of the ￿ ows of
households between SEAs leads to a combined e⁄ect of New Deal grant spending
that is di⁄erent from the sum of the separate AAA and public works and relief
e⁄ects.
7 Conclusion
The simulations from a structural model of migration ￿ ows between state eco-
nomic areas during the Second New Deal show that the uneven distribution
of New Deal grant spending helps account for approximately 12 percent of the
migration ￿ ows witnessed between 1935 and 1940. The majority of the e⁄ect
37is associated with the broad range in per capita spending on public works and
relief by the federal government. As found by Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor
(2006) in studies restricted to net migration rates by county, public works and
relief tended to increase migration into a state economic area and reduce out-
migration from the area. The AAA programs designed to restrict farm acreage
contributed to a small degree of out-migration. The overall e⁄ect of the AAA
on mobility was relatively small and positive.
These e⁄ects appear to be large relative to the e⁄ects found for modern mi-
gration in response to di⁄erences in welfare spending. There are several potential
reasons for these di⁄erences. First, the distribution of spending in the 1930s was
much less tightly tied to matching formulas that force states to spend more to
obtain more welfare funding. The negotiations between Congress and the Roo-
sevelt administration in passing the Social Security Act of 1935 ensured that the
permanent federal/state public assistance programs, like old-age assistance, aid-
to-the-blind, and aid to dependent children required matching formulas. This
matching grant feature imposed constraints on di⁄erences across states, as a
state who sought higher expenditures had to dip into their own revenues as
well. The compromise meant that the Roosevelt administration obtained much
greater control over the emergency relief funds distributed under the WPA and
public works programs that ended during World War II (Wallis, Fishback, and
Kantor 2006). Studies at the time show that despite the presence of de jure
matching formulas in the WPA, the formulas appear to have been ignored in
fact (Howard, 1943). Thus, the range in spending per capita was much larger.
Second, the unemployment and underemployment rates during the 1930s were
several orders of magnitude larger than in the modern era and the standard of
living was lower. Therefore, the same amount of federal spending in the 1930s
as in the modern era was a larger share of the person￿ s average income. Much
38of the spending was designed to put people explicitly back to work and in the
case of public works spending required movement by some people to relatively
less populated areas.
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43Appendix I: Inversion of Nested Logit in Our Model
Berry derives the inversion of the nested logit model as follows:






















There are two key simplifying assumptions Berry makes to derive the inver-
sion of the nested logit model:
a) The utility of the outside good is normalized to 0, which does not
hold for our model
b) The outside good is the sole member of its group, which does not hold
for our model
These assumptions imply:


















































gj ￿soo ) ln(sgj) = (1￿￿)￿ln(Dgj)+ln(soo) (34)
Solving for ln(Dg) and plugging into equation (7)
44ln(soj) ￿ ln(soo) = ￿j + ￿ ￿ ln(sjjg) (35)
Because there is more than one choice in the outside good￿ s group (also we
do not normalize the utility of the outside good to 0, but that is not the key





























































ln(soj) ￿ ln(soo) =
￿oj ￿ ￿oo
1 ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ [ln(Dgj) ￿ ln(Do)] (39)












gj ]) + ln(soo)
1 ￿ ￿
(41)
Subtracting these two terms,




Which gives us (as the di⁄erencing of the deltas is equivalent to normalizing
the utility of the outside good to 0) the same results at Berry:
ln(soj) ￿ ln(soo) = ￿oj ￿ ￿oo + ￿ ￿ (lnjjgj) (43)
45Appendix II: Symmetry of Creation and Retention
One complication we face in reporting marginal e⁄ects is the choice of which
marginal e⁄ect to report. As the s variable varies across observations, a di⁄erent
estimation of the marginal e⁄ect can be computed at each observation One
natural solution to this problem would be to report the mean of all estimated
marginal e⁄ects. However, as we show below, this approach also results in a
serious complication.
Consider again the migration retention term in Table 1. Table 1 expresses
the number of migrants retained in location o as the number of individuals in the
o who substitute to location o when a characteristic of o changes (own e⁄ects):
retentiono = No(1 ￿ soo) ￿ soo ￿ ￿ (44)
Another way in which we can think of this term is as the number of people in
o who substitute away from every other possible choice when a characteristic of









Nj ￿ sjjsjo ￿ ￿ (46)
Suppose that we want to ￿nd the average amount of retention. This would
entail computing retentiono for each o. To do so, we simply sum over o and













j6=o Nj ￿ sjjsjo ￿ ￿
J
(48)
Note this symmetry: the set containing the Nj￿sjjsjo term for every possible
j and o will be identical to the set containing N0soosoj for every possible value
of o and j. Thus, the average e⁄ects of retention and creation will be identical
if we sum over all observations. To obtain more intuitive results, we instead
estimate averages of the marginal e⁄ects for each of the 9 census regions.
46T
a
b
l
e
1
:
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
E
⁄
e
c
t
s
D
e
c
o
m
p
o
s
e
d
B
y
P
a
r
t
s
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
R
e
t
e
n
t
i
o
n
b
y
o
N
o
(
1
￿
s
o
o
)
￿
s
o
o
￿
￿
T
o
t
a
l
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
i
n
I
n
-
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
t
o
o
P
j
6
=
o
N
j
￿
(
1
￿
s
j
o
)
s
j
o
￿
￿
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
D
i
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
t
o
o
￿
P
j
6
=
o
N
j
￿
[
P
k
6
=
j
;
o
￿
s
j
k
s
j
o
￿
￿
]
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
C
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
t
o
o
￿
P
j
6
=
o
N
j
￿
￿
s
j
j
s
j
o
￿
￿
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
i
n
N
e
t
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
t
o
o
P
j
N
j
￿
(
1
￿
s
j
o
)
s
j
o
￿
￿
47C
o
e
f
f
.
t
-
s
t
a
t
.
C
o
e
f
f
.
t
-
s
t
a
t
.
C
o
e
f
f
.
t
-
s
t
a
t
.
C
o
e
f
f
.
t
-
s
t
a
t
.
C
o
e
f
f
.
t
-
s
t
a
t
.
L
o
g
 
o
f
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
c
h
o
o
s
i
n
g
 
S
E
A
 
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
a
l
o
n
 
m
i
g
r
a
t
i
n
g
 
o
u
t
 
o
f
 
s
t
a
t
e
0
.
2
3
3
3
0
.
4
5
0
.
0
1
6
0
.
7
5
P
e
r
 
C
a
p
i
t
a
 
A
A
A
 
S
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
 
1
9
3
5
-
1
9
3
9
-
0
.
0
0
8
-
2
.
8
8
-
0
.
0
1
1
-
2
.
0
7
P
e
r
 
C
a
p
i
t
a
 
R
e
l
i
e
f
 
a
n
d
 
P
u
b
 
W
o
r
k
s
 
1
9
3
5
-
1
9
3
9
-
0
.
0
0
1
-
1
.
7
4
0
.
0
0
8
2
.
0
2
L
a
n
d
 
A
r
e
a
 
o
f
 
S
E
A
0
.
0
0
6
3
.
1
9
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
4
0
.
0
0
0
-
0
.
4
0
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
F
a
r
m
 
S
i
z
e
0
.
0
6
2
1
.
5
7
0
.
0
9
4
4
.
0
4
0
.
0
0
3
3
.
6
4
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
D
e
v
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
V
o
t
e
s
 
f
o
r
D
e
m
o
c
r
a
t
i
c
 
C
a
n
d
i
d
a
t
e
 
i
n
 
P
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
i
a
l
E
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
1
8
9
6
-
1
9
2
8
0
.
9
1
0
2
.
0
3
0
.
0
7
6
1
.
0
3
0
.
0
3
1
4
.
0
2
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
S
E
A
s
 
i
n
 
S
t
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
O
r
i
g
i
n
 
L
-
0
.
4
8
5
-
1
.
6
5
-
0
.
0
0
2
-
0
.
0
4
-
0
.
2
0
2
-
3
1
.
1
3
L
o
g
 
o
f
 
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
 
B
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
S
E
A
C
e
n
t
r
o
i
d
s
-
1
.
9
3
4
-
5
0
.
9
9
-
1
.
5
2
3
-
3
0
.
8
2
-
0
.
2
5
3
-
0
.
5
5
-
0
.
0
8
2
-
1
.
0
5
1
.
8
7
0
4
7
.
5
2
%
 
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
P
e
r
 
C
a
p
i
t
a
 
R
e
t
a
i
l
 
S
a
l
e
s
,
1
9
2
9
-
1
9
3
3
0
.
8
1
0
5
.
6
4
0
.
8
0
7
4
.
6
0
-
2
2
.
3
2
3
-
2
.
2
2
-
3
.
6
7
7
-
2
.
3
1
-
1
.
0
0
5
-
4
.
7
9
R
e
t
a
i
l
 
S
a
l
e
s
 
P
e
r
-
C
a
p
i
t
a
,
 
1
9
2
9
0
.
0
0
1
3
.
3
7
0
.
0
0
1
2
.
4
0
-
0
.
0
4
7
-
0
.
9
3
-
0
.
0
0
2
-
0
.
3
5
-
0
.
0
0
1
-
1
.
7
8
U
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
 
A
s
 
%
 
o
f
 
P
o
p
 
A
g
e
d
 
1
0
+
,
1
9
3
0
0
.
1
3
5
3
.
5
8
0
.
1
1
0
2
.
3
0
-
0
.
8
5
4
-
0
.
2
0
0
.
0
8
0
0
.
2
4
-
0
.
1
3
9
-
2
.
5
5
%
 
L
a
y
e
d
 
o
f
f
 
1
9
3
0
3
.
9
0
5
0
.
8
4
-
8
.
1
8
0
-
1
.
7
6
4
0
0
.
1
8
3
1
.
0
7
-
8
7
.
5
4
8
-
2
.
4
4
2
.
1
4
9
0
.
3
7
%
 
o
f
 
F
a
m
i
l
i
e
s
 
O
w
n
i
n
g
 
T
h
e
i
r
 
H
o
m
e
0
.
0
1
5
5
.
9
1
-
0
.
0
0
2
-
0
.
6
7
0
.
3
4
2
1
.
4
4
-
0
.
1
6
8
-
3
.
9
7
-
0
.
0
2
4
-
5
.
7
8
%
 
o
f
 
F
a
r
m
 
A
c
r
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
F
a
i
l
u
r
e
s
,
 
1
9
2
9
0
.
0
1
9
1
.
7
6
-
0
.
0
0
7
-
0
.
5
1
1
.
6
9
8
2
.
1
7
-
0
.
0
0
8
-
0
.
0
5
-
0
.
0
0
9
-
0
.
5
0
D
u
m
m
y
 
f
o
r
 
D
u
s
t
b
o
w
l
 
C
o
u
n
t
y
-
0
.
3
0
3
-
0
.
9
0
0
.
0
9
8
0
.
1
9
4
1
.
7
2
0
2
.
5
9
6
6
.
7
4
6
4
.
9
8
0
.
5
6
4
1
.
4
5
C
r
o
p
 
V
a
l
u
e
 
p
e
r
 
F
a
r
m
 
P
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
0
.
0
0
2
4
.
5
3
0
.
0
0
1
2
.
0
1
-
0
.
1
1
6
-
2
.
7
3
0
.
0
0
3
0
.
3
3
-
0
.
0
0
5
-
6
.
4
6
%
 
o
f
 
A
d
u
l
t
 
P
o
p
 
i
n
 
M
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
E
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
0
.
0
0
2
0
.
4
5
0
.
0
0
8
1
.
2
7
-
1
.
3
4
2
-
4
.
1
2
-
0
.
0
7
2
-
2
.
3
4
-
0
.
0
1
2
-
2
.
4
9
%
 
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
P
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
1
9
2
0
-
1
9
3
0
0
.
4
8
1
3
.
2
6
1
.
1
6
5
3
.
6
8
-
4
9
.
9
0
7
-
3
.
4
0
9
.
3
5
2
4
.
7
8
0
.
6
9
9
3
.
2
0
P
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
1
9
3
0
0
.
0
0
0
3
.
7
3
0
.
0
0
0
2
.
8
4
0
.
0
0
0
-
0
.
4
5
0
.
0
0
0
-
0
.
9
7
0
.
0
0
0
3
.
4
6
%
 
B
l
a
c
k
 
i
n
 
1
9
3
0
0
.
0
0
5
1
.
8
6
0
.
0
0
6
2
.
2
7
-
0
.
2
3
8
-
1
.
2
5
0
.
0
0
7
0
.
2
8
-
0
.
0
0
5
-
1
.
6
4
%
 
U
r
b
a
n
 
i
n
 
1
9
3
0
-
0
.
0
0
4
-
1
.
7
4
-
0
.
0
0
3
-
0
.
9
5
-
0
.
1
6
1
-
0
.
6
6
-
0
.
0
1
0
-
0
.
5
0
0
.
0
0
9
2
.
7
3
%
 
R
u
r
a
l
 
F
a
r
m
 
1
9
3
0
-
0
.
5
1
4
-
1
.
8
8
1
.
2
1
5
1
.
7
1
-
1
4
3
.
5
8
4
-
4
.
0
4
2
4
.
9
6
8
5
.
0
7
1
.
0
6
8
2
.
5
3
%
 
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
B
o
r
n
 
i
n
 
1
9
3
0
0
.
0
2
7
4
.
1
7
0
.
0
0
7
0
.
6
9
0
.
7
9
9
1
.
5
7
-
0
.
0
0
3
-
0
.
0
4
-
0
.
0
7
5
-
7
.
7
9
%
 
I
l
l
i
t
e
r
a
t
e
 
O
v
e
r
 
A
g
e
 
1
0
,
 
1
9
3
0
0
.
0
1
1
1
.
3
3
-
0
.
0
1
1
-
1
.
0
6
0
.
8
0
0
1
.
1
8
-
0
.
2
8
5
-
2
.
4
8
-
0
.
0
2
9
-
2
.
5
3
%
 
P
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
C
h
u
r
c
h
 
M
e
m
b
e
r
s
 
i
n
 
1
9
3
0
-
0
.
0
0
2
-
1
.
7
8
0
.
0
0
4
1
.
9
6
-
0
.
3
4
5
-
2
.
7
6
0
.
0
7
0
3
.
3
0
0
.
0
0
8
3
.
4
9
M
e
a
n
 
o
f
 
D
e
m
 
%
 
V
o
t
e
 
f
o
r
 
P
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
,
1
8
9
6
-
1
9
2
8
-
0
.
0
0
1
-
0
.
6
1
-
0
.
0
0
3
-
0
.
8
4
0
.
3
0
6
1
.
4
8
-
0
.
0
0
6
-
0
.
2
0
0
.
0
0
4
1
.
2
2
D
u
m
m
y
 
f
o
r
 
A
t
l
a
n
t
i
c
 
C
o
a
s
t
-
0
.
0
5
0
-
0
.
4
9
0
.
0
9
6
0
.
7
0
1
0
.
5
0
0
1
.
1
5
1
.
3
5
9
1
.
5
3
-
0
.
3
9
3
-
2
.
1
9
P
a
c
i
f
i
c
 
C
o
a
s
t
0
.
8
5
8
3
.
1
9
0
.
4
4
5
1
.
3
0
1
6
.
8
5
7
0
.
9
9
2
.
4
0
7
1
.
2
8
-
0
.
6
2
1
-
1
.
8
6
G
r
e
a
t
 
L
a
k
e
s
-
0
.
0
0
2
-
0
.
0
2
-
0
.
2
4
0
-
2
.
1
7
1
2
.
5
0
5
1
.
8
1
-
1
.
0
9
7
-
1
.
6
1
0
.
3
0
4
2
.
2
7
G
u
l
f
 
C
o
a
s
t
-
0
.
1
0
9
-
0
.
6
8
0
.
3
3
5
1
.
9
9
-
1
8
.
3
5
4
-
1
.
8
3
3
.
4
7
9
3
.
4
4
0
.
1
3
8
0
.
4
3
D
u
m
m
y
 
f
o
r
 
S
E
A
 
C
o
n
t
a
i
n
i
n
g
 
R
i
v
e
r
R
u
n
n
i
n
g
 
T
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
1
1
 
t
o
 
2
0
 
C
o
u
n
t
i
e
s
0
.
0
0
8
0
.
1
7
-
0
.
0
2
0
-
0
.
4
0
1
.
2
1
7
0
.
2
7
0
.
2
0
3
0
.
4
1
-
0
.
0
4
8
-
0
.
5
9
R
i
v
e
r
 
R
u
n
n
i
n
g
 
T
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
2
1
 
t
o
 
5
0
C
o
u
n
t
i
e
s
-
0
.
0
3
6
-
0
.
6
1
0
.
0
3
5
0
.
6
3
-
2
.
7
0
6
-
0
.
5
8
-
0
.
7
6
2
-
0
.
6
8
0
.
0
7
1
0
.
9
9
D
u
m
m
y
 
f
o
r
 
R
i
v
e
r
 
R
u
n
n
i
n
g
 
T
h
r
o
u
g
h
M
o
r
e
 
t
h
a
n
 
5
1
-
0
.
2
9
3
-
4
.
4
5
-
0
.
3
1
5
-
3
.
9
9
1
3
.
4
8
3
2
.
3
4
1
.
8
9
4
2
.
3
4
0
.
1
0
2
1
.
1
0
L
a
t
i
t
u
d
e
 
o
f
 
S
E
A
-
0
.
0
7
0
-
6
.
4
0
-
0
.
0
2
2
-
1
.
5
7
0
.
9
4
5
1
.
1
6
0
.
4
1
4
3
.
6
8
0
.
1
0
8
6
.
8
3
L
o
n
g
i
t
u
d
e
 
o
f
 
S
E
A
0
.
0
3
9
1
0
.
5
3
0
.
0
2
7
5
.
1
5
0
.
3
3
2
1
.
3
5
-
0
.
0
7
0
-
2
.
4
6
-
0
.
0
4
7
-
9
.
3
1
N
2
1
6
6
9
0
2
1
6
6
9
0
2
1
6
6
9
0
2
1
6
6
9
0
2
1
6
6
9
0
F
-
S
t
a
t
 
o
n
 
R
e
l
e
v
e
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
I
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
s
4
.
7
3
8
.
6
3
2
5
4
.
0
7
P
a
r
t
i
a
l
 
R
-
2
 
o
f
 
I
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
e
s
0
.
0
5
9
9
0
.
3
4
7
1
0
.
0
7
8
8
P
-
V
a
l
u
e
 
o
n
 
H
a
n
s
o
n
 
J
0
.
4
3
5
6
4
T
a
b
l
e
 
2
:
 
 
N
l
o
g
i
t
 
F
i
x
e
d
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
W
i
t
h
 
R
o
b
u
s
t
 
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
E
r
r
o
r
s
O
L
S
I
V
 
M
a
i
n
 
E
q
u
a
t
i
o
n
F
i
r
s
t
 
S
t
a
g
e
 
P
W
 
R
e
l
i
e
f
F
r
i
s
t
 
S
t
a
g
e
 
A
A
A
F
i
r
s
t
 
S
t
a
g
e
 
W
i
t
h
i
n
 
G
r
o
u
p
48N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
N
e
w
E
n
g
l
a
n
d
M
i
d
d
l
e
A
t
l
a
n
t
i
c
E
a
s
t
N
o
r
t
h
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
W
e
s
t
N
o
r
t
h
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
S
o
u
t
h
A
t
l
a
n
t
i
c
E
a
s
t
S
o
u
t
h
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
W
e
s
t
S
o
u
t
h
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
M
o
u
n
t
a
i
n
P
a
c
i
f
i
c
0
.
0
4
4
%
0
.
0
6
7
%
0
.
0
6
9
%
0
.
0
5
3
%
0
.
0
3
3
%
0
.
0
5
3
%
0
.
0
5
3
%
0
.
0
3
1
%
0
.
0
1
3
%
0
.
0
1
4
%
0
.
0
5
3
%
0
.
0
9
9
%
0
.
0
6
6
%
0
.
0
6
5
%
0
.
0
3
4
%
0
.
0
7
4
%
0
.
0
3
9
%
0
.
0
3
1
%
0
.
0
3
2
%
0
.
0
3
5
%
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
D
i
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
0
.
0
0
4
%
0
.
0
0
9
%
0
.
0
0
6
%
0
.
0
0
5
%
0
.
0
0
2
%
0
.
0
0
6
%
0
.
0
0
3
%
0
.
0
0
2
%
0
.
0
0
2
%
0
.
0
0
1
%
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
C
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
0
.
0
4
9
%
0
.
0
9
1
%
0
.
0
6
1
%
0
.
0
6
0
%
0
.
0
3
2
%
0
.
0
6
8
%
0
.
0
3
7
%
0
.
0
2
9
%
0
.
0
3
1
%
0
.
0
3
3
%
0
.
0
9
7
%
0
.
1
6
6
%
0
.
1
3
6
%
0
.
1
1
8
%
0
.
0
6
7
%
0
.
1
2
6
%
0
.
0
9
2
%
0
.
0
6
1
%
0
.
0
4
5
%
0
.
0
4
9
%
1
0
0
2
1
0
2
1
5
1
1
5
6
8
1
0
0
1
1
2
6
2
1
6
2
4
1
0
8
1
3
7
3
4
0
1
3
7
6
2
9
4
7
0
5
3
3
2
3
5
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
D
i
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
8
1
2
2
5
1
0
4
7
5
3
2
1
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
C
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
1
0
0
1
2
5
3
1
5
1
2
7
5
8
8
6
6
5
5
0
3
0
3
4
2
0
8
3
4
7
5
5
6
2
5
2
1
3
0
1
9
3
1
8
2
1
1
5
4
8
5
9
R
e
t
e
n
t
i
o
n
4
8
.
1
5
%
6
0
.
4
8
%
3
8
.
7
7
%
4
5
.
5
5
%
5
2
.
5
1
%
5
1
.
6
7
%
6
1
.
4
9
%
5
3
.
9
4
%
3
3
.
5
3
%
4
0
.
7
0
%
D
i
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
3
.
7
1
%
3
.
5
8
%
4
.
5
3
%
4
.
0
1
%
2
.
7
5
%
3
.
7
8
%
2
.
7
5
%
2
.
4
6
%
3
.
1
9
%
2
.
1
9
%
C
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
4
8
.
1
5
%
3
5
.
9
5
%
5
6
.
7
0
%
5
0
.
4
5
%
4
4
.
7
4
%
4
4
.
5
6
%
3
5
.
7
6
%
4
3
.
6
0
%
6
3
.
2
8
%
5
7
.
1
1
%
T
a
b
l
e
 
3
:
 
 
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
f
o
r
 
 
P
W
 
a
n
d
 
R
e
l
i
e
f
E
f
f
e
c
t
 
o
n
 
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
R
a
t
e
s
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
R
e
t
e
n
t
i
o
n
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
I
m
m
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
N
e
t
 
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
R
a
w
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
R
e
t
e
n
t
i
o
n
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
I
m
m
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
N
e
t
 
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
D
e
c
o
m
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
T
h
e
 
s
y
m
m
e
t
r
y
 
p
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
r
e
t
e
n
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
c
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
l
e
v
e
l
,
 
e
x
p
l
a
i
n
e
d
 
i
n
 
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
 
I
I
,
 
h
o
l
d
s
 
o
n
l
y
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
r
a
w
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
,
 
n
o
t
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
.
 
T
h
i
s
 
i
s
 
d
u
e
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
n
o
n
l
i
n
e
a
r
 
n
a
t
u
r
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
t
r
a
n
s
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
m
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
t
h
a
t
 
o
c
c
u
r
s
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
t
h
e
 
r
a
w
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
i
s
 
d
i
v
i
d
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
e
a
c
h
 
S
E
A
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
n
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
d
 
o
v
e
r
 
a
l
l
 
S
E
A
s
.
49N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
N
e
w
E
n
g
l
a
n
d
M
i
d
d
l
e
A
t
l
a
n
t
i
c
E
a
s
t
N
o
r
t
h
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
W
e
s
t
N
o
r
t
h
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
S
o
u
t
h
A
t
l
a
n
t
i
c
E
a
s
t
S
o
u
t
h
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
W
e
s
t
S
o
u
t
h
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
M
o
u
n
t
a
i
n
P
a
c
i
f
i
c
-
0
.
0
6
4
%
-
0
.
0
9
7
%
-
0
.
1
0
0
%
-
0
.
0
7
7
%
-
0
.
0
4
8
%
-
0
.
0
7
7
%
-
0
.
0
7
6
%
-
0
.
0
4
5
%
-
0
.
0
1
9
%
-
0
.
0
2
0
%
-
0
.
0
7
7
%
-
0
.
1
4
4
%
-
0
.
0
9
6
%
-
0
.
0
9
4
%
-
0
.
0
4
9
%
-
0
.
1
0
7
%
-
0
.
0
5
7
%
-
0
.
0
4
4
%
-
0
.
0
4
7
%
-
0
.
0
5
0
%
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
D
i
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
-
0
.
0
0
5
%
-
0
.
0
1
2
%
-
0
.
0
0
8
%
-
0
.
0
0
7
%
-
0
.
0
0
3
%
-
0
.
0
0
8
%
-
0
.
0
0
4
%
-
0
.
0
0
2
%
-
0
.
0
0
2
%
-
0
.
0
0
2
%
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
C
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
-
0
.
0
7
1
%
-
0
.
1
3
2
%
-
0
.
0
8
8
%
-
0
.
0
8
7
%
-
0
.
0
4
6
%
-
0
.
0
9
9
%
-
0
.
0
5
3
%
-
0
.
0
4
2
%
-
0
.
0
4
5
%
-
0
.
0
4
9
%
-
0
.
1
4
1
%
-
0
.
2
4
1
%
-
0
.
1
9
7
%
-
0
.
1
7
1
%
-
0
.
0
9
7
%
-
0
.
1
8
3
%
-
0
.
1
3
4
%
-
0
.
0
8
9
%
-
0
.
0
6
6
%
-
0
.
0
7
0
%
-
1
4
6
-
3
0
5
-
3
1
3
-
1
6
7
-
9
9
-
1
4
5
-
1
6
2
-
9
0
-
2
3
-
3
5
-
1
5
7
-
1
9
9
-
4
9
4
-
1
9
9
-
9
0
-
1
3
6
-
1
0
2
-
7
7
-
4
6
-
5
1
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
D
i
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
-
1
1
-
1
8
-
3
7
-
1
5
-
5
-
1
1
-
7
-
4
-
2
-
2
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
C
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
-
1
4
6
-
1
8
1
-
4
5
7
-
1
8
5
-
8
4
-
1
2
5
-
9
4
-
7
3
-
4
4
-
4
9
-
3
0
2
-
5
0
4
-
8
0
7
-
3
6
6
-
1
8
9
-
2
8
1
-
2
6
4
-
1
6
7
-
7
0
-
8
6
R
e
t
e
n
t
i
o
n
4
8
.
1
5
%
6
0
.
4
8
%
3
8
.
7
7
%
4
5
.
5
5
%
5
2
.
5
1
%
5
1
.
6
7
%
6
1
.
4
9
%
5
3
.
9
4
%
3
3
.
5
3
%
4
0
.
7
0
%
D
i
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
3
.
7
1
%
3
.
5
8
%
4
.
5
3
%
4
.
0
1
%
2
.
7
5
%
3
.
7
8
%
2
.
7
5
%
2
.
4
6
%
3
.
1
9
%
2
.
1
9
%
C
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
4
8
.
1
5
%
3
5
.
9
5
%
5
6
.
7
0
%
5
0
.
4
5
%
4
4
.
7
4
%
4
4
.
5
6
%
3
5
.
7
6
%
4
3
.
6
0
%
6
3
.
2
8
%
5
7
.
1
1
%
T
h
e
 
s
y
m
m
e
t
r
y
 
p
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
r
e
t
e
n
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
c
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
l
e
v
e
l
,
 
e
x
p
l
a
i
n
e
d
 
i
n
 
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
 
I
I
,
 
h
o
l
d
s
 
o
n
l
y
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
r
a
w
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
,
 
n
o
t
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
.
 
T
h
i
s
 
i
s
 
d
u
e
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
n
o
n
l
i
n
e
a
r
 
n
a
t
u
r
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
t
r
a
n
s
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
m
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
t
h
a
t
 
o
c
c
u
r
s
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
t
h
e
 
r
a
w
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
i
s
 
d
i
v
i
d
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
e
a
c
h
 
S
E
A
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
n
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
d
 
o
v
e
r
 
a
l
l
 
S
E
A
s
.
T
a
b
l
e
 
4
:
 
 
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
f
o
r
 
A
A
A
E
f
f
e
c
t
 
o
n
 
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
R
a
t
e
s
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
R
e
t
e
n
t
i
o
n
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
I
m
m
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
N
e
t
 
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
R
a
w
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
R
e
t
e
n
t
i
o
n
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
I
m
m
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
N
e
t
 
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
D
e
c
o
m
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
50T
a
b
l
e
5
:
C
o
u
n
t
e
r
f
a
c
t
u
a
l
s
o
M
N
e
w
D
e
a
l
E
⁄
e
c
t
R
a
w
%
A
c
t
u
a
l
9
;
0
6
2
;
7
5
1
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
w
i
t
h
N
e
w
D
e
a
l
6
,
4
9
6
,
9
1
5
C
o
u
n
t
e
r
f
a
c
t
u
a
l
s
N
o
P
u
b
l
i
c
W
o
r
k
s
a
n
d
R
e
l
i
e
f
5
,
8
0
2
,
3
8
7
6
9
4
,
5
2
8
1
1
.
9
7
%
N
o
A
A
A
6
,
4
3
4
,
3
5
0
6
2
,
5
6
5
0
.
9
7
%
N
o
N
e
w
D
e
a
l
5
,
8
0
7
,
4
4
5
6
8
9
,
4
7
0
1
1
.
8
7
%
51F
i
g
u
r
e
 
1
:
 
I
n
 
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
O
u
t
 
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
R
a
t
e
s
0
.
0
0
%
5
.
0
0
%
1
0
.
0
0
%
1
5
.
0
0
%
2
0
.
0
0
%
2
5
.
0
0
%
3
0
.
0
0
%
3
5
.
0
0
%
0
.
0
0
%
1
0
.
0
0
%
2
0
.
0
0
%
3
0
.
0
0
%
4
0
.
0
0
%
5
0
.
0
0
%
6
0
.
0
0
%
I
n
 
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
R
a
t
e
s
O
u
t
 
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
R
a
t
e
s
52F
i
g
u
r
e
 
2
:
 
N
e
t
 
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
R
a
t
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
W
o
r
k
s
 
a
n
d
 
R
e
l
i
e
f
 
S
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
-
3
0
.
0
0
%
-
2
0
.
0
0
%
-
1
0
.
0
0
%
0
.
0
0
%
1
0
.
0
0
%
2
0
.
0
0
%
3
0
.
0
0
%
4
0
.
0
0
%
0
.
0
0
5
0
.
0
0
1
0
0
.
0
0
1
5
0
.
0
0
2
0
0
.
0
0
2
5
0
.
0
0
3
0
0
.
0
0
3
5
0
.
0
0
4
0
0
.
0
0
P
e
r
 
C
a
p
i
t
a
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
W
o
r
k
s
 
a
n
d
 
R
e
l
i
e
f
 
S
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
N
e
t
 
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
R
a
t
e
53F
i
g
u
r
e
 
3
:
 
A
A
A
 
S
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
N
e
t
 
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
R
a
t
e
s
-
3
0
.
0
0
%
-
2
0
.
0
0
%
-
1
0
.
0
0
%
0
.
0
0
%
1
0
.
0
0
%
2
0
.
0
0
%
3
0
.
0
0
%
4
0
.
0
0
%
0
.
0
0
2
0
.
0
0
4
0
.
0
0
6
0
.
0
0
8
0
.
0
0
1
0
0
.
0
0
1
2
0
.
0
0
P
e
r
 
C
a
p
i
t
a
 
A
A
A
 
S
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
N
e
t
 
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
R
a
t
e
54F
i
g
u
r
e
 
4
:
 
R
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
M
a
g
n
i
t
u
d
e
s
 
o
f
 
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
o
f
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
W
o
r
k
s
 
a
n
d
 
R
e
l
i
e
f
 
o
n
 
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
R
a
t
e
s
 
i
n
t
o
 
S
E
A
s
,
 
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
b
y
 
R
e
g
i
o
n
0
.
0
0
0
%
0
.
0
1
0
%
0
.
0
2
0
%
0
.
0
3
0
%
0
.
0
4
0
%
0
.
0
5
0
%
0
.
0
6
0
%
0
.
0
7
0
%
0
.
0
8
0
%
0
.
0
9
0
%
0
.
1
0
0
%
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
N
e
w
E
n
g
l
a
n
d
M
i
d
d
l
e
A
t
l
a
n
t
i
c
E
a
s
t
 
N
o
r
t
h
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
W
e
s
t
 
N
o
r
t
h
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
S
o
u
t
h
A
t
l
a
n
t
i
c
E
a
s
t
 
S
o
u
t
h
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
W
e
s
t
 
S
o
u
t
h
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
M
o
u
n
t
a
i
n
P
a
c
i
f
i
c
R
e
t
e
n
t
i
o
n
D
i
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
C
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
55F
i
g
u
r
e
 
5
:
 
R
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
M
a
g
n
i
t
u
d
e
s
 
o
f
 
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
o
f
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
W
o
r
k
s
 
a
n
d
 
R
e
l
i
e
f
 
o
n
 
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
F
l
o
w
s
 
i
n
t
o
 
S
E
A
s
,
 
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
b
y
 
R
e
g
i
o
n
0
5
0
1
0
0
1
5
0
2
0
0
2
5
0
3
0
0
3
5
0
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
N
e
w
E
n
g
l
a
n
d
M
i
d
d
l
e
A
t
l
a
n
t
i
c
E
a
s
t
 
N
o
r
t
h
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
W
e
s
t
 
N
o
r
t
h
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
S
o
u
t
h
A
t
l
a
n
t
i
c
E
a
s
t
 
S
o
u
t
h
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
W
e
s
t
 
S
o
u
t
h
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
M
o
u
n
t
a
i
n
P
a
c
i
f
i
c
R
e
t
e
n
t
i
o
n
D
i
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
C
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
56F
i
g
u
r
e
 
6
:
 
R
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
M
a
g
n
i
t
u
d
e
s
 
o
f
 
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
o
f
 
A
A
A
 
o
n
 
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
R
a
t
e
s
 
i
n
t
o
 
S
E
A
s
,
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
b
y
 
R
e
g
i
o
n
-
0
.
1
4
0
%
-
0
.
1
2
0
%
-
0
.
1
0
0
%
-
0
.
0
8
0
%
-
0
.
0
6
0
%
-
0
.
0
4
0
%
-
0
.
0
2
0
%
0
.
0
0
0
%
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
N
e
w
E
n
g
l
a
n
d
M
i
d
d
l
e
A
t
l
a
n
t
i
c
E
a
s
t
 
N
o
r
t
h
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
W
e
s
t
 
N
o
r
t
h
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
S
o
u
t
h
A
t
l
a
n
t
i
c
E
a
s
t
 
S
o
u
t
h
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
W
e
s
t
 
S
o
u
t
h
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
M
o
u
n
t
a
i
n
P
a
c
i
f
i
c
R
e
t
e
n
t
i
o
n
D
i
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
C
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
57F
i
g
u
r
e
 
7
:
 
R
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
M
a
g
n
i
t
u
d
e
s
 
o
f
 
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
o
f
 
A
A
A
 
o
n
 
M
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
F
l
o
w
s
 
i
n
t
o
 
S
E
A
s
,
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
b
y
 
R
e
g
i
o
n
-
5
0
0
-
4
5
0
-
4
0
0
-
3
5
0
-
3
0
0
-
2
5
0
-
2
0
0
-
1
5
0
-
1
0
0
-
5
0
0
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
N
e
w
E
n
g
l
a
n
d
M
i
d
d
l
e
A
t
l
a
n
t
i
c
E
a
s
t
 
N
o
r
t
h
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
W
e
s
t
 
N
o
r
t
h
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
S
o
u
t
h
A
t
l
a
n
t
i
c
E
a
s
t
 
S
o
u
t
h
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
W
e
s
t
 
S
o
u
t
h
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
M
o
u
n
t
a
i
n
P
a
c
i
f
i
c
R
e
t
e
n
t
i
o
n
D
i
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
C
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
58